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IV.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1953 as amended).
V.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

a.

The issues presented for review are:

1.

Did the lower court materially err in ruling that, as a

matter of law, Mr. Wilker's negligence was not the proximate
cause of a post-collision ambulance ride, diagnostic
examinations, and other injuries sustained by Mr. LeBlanc in the
automobile collision of October 6, 1992?
2.

Did the lower court materially err in denying Mr.

LeBlanc's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and New
Trial on the grounds that there was sufficient evidence to
support the jury's verdict that Mr. Wilker's negligence was not
the proximate cause of a post-collision ambulance ride,
diagnostic examinations, and other injuries sustained by Mr.
LeBlanc in the automobile collision of October 6, 1992?
b.

The standards of review in this case are as follows:

1.

A lower court's findings of facts underlying its

decision to grant or deny a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and new trial may be upheld unless they are clearly
erroneous.

However, the appellate court may review the lower

1

court's legal conclusions in regards thereto under a correction
of error standard.

State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah

App. 1991).
2.

In considering a motion for a new trial based upon

insufficient evidence, the appellate court is required to accord
the evidence presented every reasonable inference fairly drawn
from the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party.

Peats v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 746 P.2d 1191, 1192 (Utah

App. 1987).
3.

The appellate court may reverse a trial court's denial

of a motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict or new trial
only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party, there is no sufficient evidence upon which the
jury could have based its verdict.

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.,

817 P.2d 789, 799-800 (Utah 1991); King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618,
620, 621 (Utah 1987); Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown &
Gunnel1, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 57-58 (Utah 1986).
VI.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS

Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in
relevant part:
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close
of all of the evidence is denied or for any reason is not

2

granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to
the jury subject to a later determination of the legal
questions raised by the motion. Not later than ten days
after entry of judgment, a party who has moved for a
directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any
judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment
entered in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict
. . . .
A motion for new trial may be joined with this
motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative.
If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment
to stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new
trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested
verdict had been directed. . . .
U. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in
relevant part:
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a
new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on
all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes.
. . .
. . . .

(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to
have been given under the influence of passion or
prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
U. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
VII.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in
the Lower Court.
On or about October 6, 1992 Plaintiff/Petitioner Fred

LeBlanc

("Mr.

LeBlanc'') was severely injured when the vehicle he

3

was driving was struck from behind by a vehicle driven by
Defendant/Respondent James Wilker ("Mr. Wilker").

Mr. LeBlanc's

complaint seeks to recover damages for his injuries.
At the end of

a four-day jury trial, the lower court

granted Mr. LeBlanc's motion for a directed verdict on the issue
of negligence and denied Mr. LeBlanc's motion on the issue of
proximate cause.

(R. 669). The first issue of the instant

appeal concerns the lower court's ruling denying Mr. LeBlanc's
motion for a directed verdict on the issue of proximate cause.
After deliberating for 1 hour and 10 minutes, the jury
returned with a "no cause" verdict in Mr. Wilker's favor.
Exhibit "A."

See

The second issue of the instant appeal concerns the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict.
Subsequently, Mr. LeBlanc moved the lower court for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and new trial, which the lower court
denied.

See Exhibits "B" and "C." The third issue of the

instant appeal concerns the lower court's order denying Mr.
LeBlanc's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new
trial.

Mr. LeBlanc filed his Notice of Appeal on April 26, 1995.

See Exhibit "D."
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B.

Statement of the Facts Related to the Issues Presented for
Review.
1.

On or about October 6, 1992, Mr, LeBlanc, was in a rear-

end automobile collision with Mr. Wilker.
2.

(R. 95-95, 105-106).

Mr. LeBlanc's automobile sustained approximately $6,000

damage.

(R. 98).

3.

Mr. LeBlanc was transported by ambulance to a local

hospital's emergency room.
4.

(R. 99, 446).

Mr. LeBlanc incurred expenses for his transport by

ambulance.
5.

(R. Ill, 113).

In the local hospital's emergency room, Mr. LeBlanc was

examined by Dr. Amy Geruso.
6.

(R. 445-458).

At the local hospital, x-rays, CT scans, and other

diagnostic examination of Mr. LeBlanc were taken.

(R. 445-450,

454-456).
7.
scans.
8.

Mr. LeBlanc incurred expenses for his x-rays and CT
(R. 112-113, 445-450, 454-456).
At trial, medical expert witnesses testified that Mr.

LeBlanc suffered whiplash from the automobile collision with Mr.
Wilker.
9.

(R. 246-247, 450).
At trial, medical expert witnesses testified that Mr.

LeBlanc suffered psychological trauma and head injury from the
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automobile collision with Mr. Wilker.

(R. 177-179, 188-194, 260-

262, 384, 388, 397, 579-580, 639-640, 651).
10.

At trial, a medical expert witness testified that Mr.

LeBlanc suffered back injuries from the automobile collision with
Mr. Wilker.
11.

(R. 246-247).

At trial, no medical expert witness testified to a

reasonable degree of medical certainty that the foregoing
injuries were not proximately caused by Mr. Wilker's automobile
collision with Mr. LeBlanc.

(R. 150-194, 238-296, 332-350, 370-

417, 443-458, 477-519, 568-587, 595-652).
12.

At trial, a medical expert witness testified that Mr.

LeBlanc was "an extreme symptom magnifier."
13.

At trial, medical expert witnesses testified that Mr.

LeBlanc was a malingerer.
14.

(R. 501).

(R. 502, 586, 623-624, 645) .

At trial, no medical expert witness testified to a

reasonable degree of medical certainty that Mr. LeBlanc did not
receive any brain or head injury from the automobile collision
with Mr. Wilker. (R. 150-194, 238-296, 332-350, 370-417, 443-458,
477-519, 568-587, 595-652).
15.

At the close of Mr. Wilker's case, counsel for Mr.

LeBlanc's moved for a directed verdict on the issues of
negligence, proximate cause, cause in fact, and causation in
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general.
16.

(R. 666-667).
The trial court granted Mr. LeBlanc's motion for a

directed verdict on the issue of negligence.
17.

(R. 669).

The trial court denied Mr. LeBlanc's motion for a

directed verdict on the issue of proximate cause.
18.

After deliberating for 1 hour and 10 minutes, the jury

returned a "no cause" verdict.
19.

(R. 669).

(R. 730), see Exhibit "A."

On December 19, 1994, Mr. LeBlanc moved the trial court

for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial.

See

Exhibit "B."
20.

On April 3, 1995, the trial court denied Mr. LeBlanc's

motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial.
See Exhibit "C."
21.
Appeal.

On April 26, 1995, Mr. LeBlanc filed his Notice of
See Exhibit "D."
VIII.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Because of the doctrine of avoidable consequences, no
sufficient evidence exists to support the legal conclusions of
the lower court that Mr. Wilker's negligence was not the
proximate cause of any injuries sustained by Mr. LeBlanc in the
automobile collision on or about October 6, 1992. Although Mr.
Wilker presented sufficient evidence to raise a factual question
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with regard to some of Mr. LeBlanc's claimed injuries, no factual
question was raised with regard to other specific injuries
claimed by Mr. LeBlanc.

Therefore, this case should be reversed

and remanded for further proceedings.
IX.
I.

ARGUMENT

THE DOCTRINE OF AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES PRECLUDES, AS A
MATTER OF LAW, ANY FINDING THAT MR. WILKER' S NEGLIGENCE WAS
NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF ANY OF MR. LEBLANC7 S INJURIES.
The overwhelming weight of evidence supports the

propositions that Mr. LeBlanc: 1) needed an ambulance, 2) needed
diagnostic examination, and 3) and did suffer neck, back, and
closed head injuries proximately caused by the automobile
collision with Mr. Wilker —

which proved Mr. LeBlanc's case in

chief, and which is summarized in section I.A. below.
Essentially no evidence rebuts these propositions, but Mr.
LeBlanc has marshaled that evidence in section II.A. below.
A.

The evidence marshaled in support of the lower court's
rulings on Mr. LeBlanc's motion for a directed verdict on
the issue of proximate cause and motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and new trial is insufficient to
support those rulings.
A view of the evidence presented at trial in the light most

favorable to the prevailing party cannot sustain a ruling that
Mr. Wilker's negligence was not the proximate cause of any of Mr.
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LeBlanc's injuries.

In Utah, "[t]o successfully attack the

verdict, an appellant must marshall all the evidence supporting
the verdict and then demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is
insufficient to support it." Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745
P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987) . All evidence which could arguably
support the verdict is marshaled in section II.A., infra, pp. 2131.
When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the
evidence marshaled in support of the jury's verdict may be
sufficient to support a finding that Mr. Wilker's negligence was
not the cause of some of Mr. LeBlanc's injuries.

However, the

testimony of Dr. Daniel Vine regarding diagnostic examinations
and Mr. Wilker's witness, the emergency room physician Dr. Amy
Geruso, precludes a ruling that, as a matter of law, Mr. Wilker's
negligence was not the cause of any of Mr. LeBlanc's injuries.
The relevant portions of Officer Todd Griffiths' testimony
regarding the automobile collision scene follows.
Officer Todd Griffiths
Direct examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. Summerhays
at R. 99.
Q

What did you do next — strike that.
LeBlanc any further at the scene?
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Did you see Mr.

A

No. Like I say, he was being attended to by medical
personnel. I talked to him briefly at the scene and
then I let them do their job in taking care of him.

Q

Did you have a chance to see what they did?

A

When I arrived I believe they had just taken him out of
the vehicle on a stretcher, neck brace, back board,
loading him into the ambulance.

The relevant portions of Dr. Vine's testimony regarding the
diagnostic examination of Mr. LeBlanc follows.
Dr. Daniel Vine, Mr. LeBlanc's neurologist.
Direct examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. Summerhays
at R. 374-375, 417.
Q
Now, will you explain to us just generally your course
of treatment of Fred LeBlanc, Doctor, if you would from
this point forward?
A
Well, based on some of the work that had been done xray-wise even before I saw Fred, I was concerned that
there was a problem with his back. And his main
complaints were involving his back and his neck, pain.
So if there is a question of a disk problem, of a
ruptured disk, it basically boils down to two ways to
treat it, surgery or not surgery. So initially I
wanted to ascertain whether or not surgery was going to
be necessary.
Q

How do you make that ascertainment?

A

Well, for me I referred him to a surgeon because I
wanted an expert opinion along those lines. . . .

Redirect examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V.
Summerhays at R. 417.
Q
Were the medical expenses and bills that you charged to
Mr. LeBlanc reasonable and necessary under the
circumstances?
A

I thought so.

10

The relevant portions of Dr. Geruso's testimony regarding
Mr. LeBlanc's post-collision ambulance ride and diagnostic
examination follows.
Dr. Amy Michelle Geruso, Mr. LeBlanc's emergency room physician.
Direct examination by Mr. Wilker's counsel Brett Pearce at R.
446-450.
Q
What was your understanding as to why he was coming
into the emergency room?
A

Well, he told me that he was stopped at a stop sign,
was restrained in a seat belt and was rear-ended by
another car. He was transported by the ambulance in a C
collar and on a backboard. And that's when I saw him.

Q

Would you just in brief narrative fashion explain to
the jury what examination you took him through and
maybe help them understand why.

A

If the patient is complaining of neck pain, I need to
check for tenderness on palpation to the muscles in the
neck. And he did complain of some tenderness over his
cervical spine. And he was still in the cervical
collar at that time. So what we do is send them to the
radiologist for x-rays without taking the collar off to
make sure there is no unstable fractures or problems
there. So he did go to radiology for cervical spine
x-rays. The radiologist had a question about one of
the bones, so he was sent directly to CT scan for
limited views of the certain cervical bone that the
radiologist had a question of, and that was cleared as
no fractures, no pathology. And so they were able to
remove the cervical collar in the radiology department
and send him back to me for the remainder of the
examine [sic].
So with the collar off he did have some tenderness
of the muscles, the paracervical muscles next to the
spine. He had full range of motion of his neck, so
full flexion and forward and lateral flexion. You're
also concerned about a good neurological examine [sic]
11

so you test for strength and sensation in the arms and
reflexes, and those were all normal.
Then further on the back examine [sic], just go
along the spine, just checking for tenderness, go along
the muscles next to the spine. And he did have some
mild tenderness in his lower back. So even though he
hadn't complained of lower back pain, he had a little
bit of discomfort there in the muscles.
Q

What were your specific findings with regard to the
neck?

A

That he had some tenderness over the paracervical
muscles and also mild tenderness over the cervical
spine, but that he did have full range of motion.

Q

What was your diagnosis after seeing Mr. LeBlanc and
examining him?

A

My diagnosis was cervical neck strain, muscle strain
and also lumbar muscle strain.

Cross examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. Summerhays
at R. 455-456.
Q
Now, you felt his condition was serious enough to get
an x-ray. Is that right?
A

Yes.

Q

What implications, if any, does that have? Is it
routine for everybody that comes in to have them have
an x-ray?

A

For motor vehicle accidents, any neck or back pain
warrants a x-ray.

Q

So you did that out of abundance of caution.

A

He was complaining of neck pain. And we could not
clear his cervical spine without x-rays.

(R. 446-456).
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Dr. Geruso's testimony is significant by establishing that
Mr. LeBlanc experienced pain and injuries immediately after the
automobile collision with Mr. Wilker.
In Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., the Supreme Court of
Utah held that "the doctrine of ^avoidable consequences' mandates
that the plaintiff submit to medically advisable treatment.
Failure to do so may destroy the plaintiff's right to recover for
a condition that he or she could have thereby avoided or
alleviated".

858 P.2d 970, 976 (Utah 1993).

Assuming arguendo

that Mr. LeBlanc suffered no physical injuries from the rear-end
automobile with Mr. Wilker, the undisputed testimony shows that
it was prudent, reasonable and necessary to transport Mr. LeBlanc
by ambulance to a local hospital for emergency room treatment—if
only to find that Mr. LeBlanc was in perfect health.

Dr. Vine

also acted reasonably in ordering diagnostic examinations for Mr.
LeBlanc.
law.

Such principles underlie Utah's medical monitoring case

Id.
However, the lower court erroneously ruled that Mr. Wilker's

negligence was not a proximate cause of any of Mr. LeBlanc's
injuries, in view of the fact that Mr. Wilker failed to proffer
any evidence which would have shown either that Mr. LeBlanc did
not incur specific costs or that Mr. LeBlanc's treatments were
13

not reasonable and necessary.

In Hansen, the Utah Supreme Court

held that costs attributable to diagnostic examination are
"consistent with the definition of ^injury' in the Restatement of
Torts."

Id. at 977 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 7).

To illustrate this point, the Hansen court borrowed a
hypothetical employed by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia.

See Friends For All Children, Inc. v.

Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
In affirming a federal district court's order "that a
reasonable need for medical examinations is compensable, even
absent proof of other injury," the Friends court stated:
To aid our analysis of whether tort law should
encompass a cause of action for diagnostic examinations
without proof of actual injury, it is useful to . . .
hypothesize a simple, everyday accident involving two
individuals, whom we shall identify as Smith and Jones:
Jones is knocked down by a motorbike which Smith is
riding through a red light. Jones lands on his head
with some force. Understandably shaken, Jones enters a
hospital where doctors recommend that he undergo a
battery of tests to determine whether he has suffered
any internal head injuries. The tests prove negative,
but Jones sues Smith solely for what turns out to be
the substantial cost of the diagnostic examinations.
From our example, it is clear that even in the

absence

of physical injury Jones ought to be able to recover the
cost for the various diagnostic
examinations
proximately
caused by Smith's negligent action.
A cause of action
allowing recovery for the expense of diagnostic examinations
recommended by competent physicians will, in theory, deter
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misconduct whether it be negligent motorbike riding or
negligent aircraft manufacture. The cause of action also
accords with commonly shared intuitions of normative justice
which underlie the common law of tort. The motorbike rider,
through his negligence, caused the plaintiff, in the opinion
of medical experts, to need specific medical services—a
cost that is neither inconsequential nor of a kind the
community generally accepts as part of the wear and tear of
daily life. Under these principles of tort law, the
motorbiker should pay.
Friends, 746 F.2d at 825 (emphasis added).

In the instant case,

the testimony of both Dr. Geruso and Dr. Vine exemplify
situations where the doctrine of avoidable consequences mandates
that Mr. Wilker should pay for the costs Mr. LeBlanc incurred as
a direct and proximate result of the automobile collision.
Additional testimony from medical experts —

which the jury

had to disbelieve in order to reach its "no cause verdict" —
supports the proposition that Mr. LeBlanc was injured and that
such injuries were proximately caused by Mr. Wilker's negligence.
Dr. Ralph Gant, Mr. LeBlanc's psychologist.
Direct examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. Summerhays
at R. 176-177.
Q
Based on your initial history and review of his
condition, what were your initial working diagnoses?
A

For Mr. LeBlanc, my initial diagnosis was that of a
post concussional syndrome, in other words, the
aftermath of a concussion. In addition, Mr. LeBlanc
presented with a significant amount of depression.

Q

After your 45 hours of review, what are your current
diagnoses for Mr. LeBlanc?

15

A

Well, the question is somewhat complex. Mr. LeBlanc
has been retested, I understand, and I have copies of a
report of a second follow-up testing with him. Mr.
LeBlancfs condition appears quite deteriorated over
time. He still presents with the signs of major
depression. He still presents with the generalized
anxiety disorder. But there is some signs of emerging
panic that are quite severe as well. Mr. LeBlanc
presents a significant number of panic attacks per
week.
Mr. LeBlanc also, if the more recent testing is in
any way accurate, looks more like a dementia which is a
more serious disorder, than a post concussional. It
looks more like a dementia due to head trauma. This is
a condition which is especially marked by losses of
memory, general cognitive functioning, losses of
concentration and tension. So this is more to the
point of what we are seeing right now.

Dr. Gant (cont.)
Direct examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. Summerhays
at R. 265-266.
Q
Now, Dr. Gant, there has been a lot of discussion here,
and I suppose there will be a lot more, about the fact
that Mr. LeBlanc is malingering or embellishing or
lying or misrepresenting. In your opinion has he told
you the truth, and is your opinion based upon valid
medical evidence?
A

I believe that my opinions are based upon valid
information, information that I have corroborated
through interviews and testing and through my interview
with Mr. LeBlanc!s wife. I don't have any evidence of
malingering on the part of Mr. LeBlanc. I have had
reports of his involvement with other psychologists in
which information that he reported was not exactly
correct. But I don't have that experience with Mr.
LeBlanc.

Q

In your opinion did he tell you the truth?

A

In my opinion, my information is valid.

16

Cross examination by Mr. Wilker's counsel Brett Pearce at R. 272273, 274-275.
Q
These charts that I have gone through with you result
in 19 different psychological symptoms that you have
diagnosed. You are relating all of those to the car
accident. Right?
A

I have no other evidence beyond that.

Q

Maybe you just lost me.
Now this is all attributable to the one single
episode that you have discussed, correct, the one
single trauma?

A

That's the only trauma of which I am aware.

Q

Do you know if Mr. LeBlanc even struck his head on
anything inside that car when the accident occurred?

A

The only evidence I have are the reports of a dentist
who has indicated to me that teeth were fractured, that
there has been an injury to the temperomandibular [sic]
regions.

Redirect examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V.
Summerhays at R. 292.
Q
Was that caused by the accident in your opinion,
growing out of the dementia due to head trauma?
A

If indeed the dementia had occurred and there were no
other episodes to explain it, I could find nothing else
to attribute that to.

Recross examination by Mr. Wilkerfs counsel Brett Pearce at R.
296.
Q
Dr. Gant, are you saying that this accident may have
affected Mr. LeBlanc's acts to be honest with
healthcare providers?
A

I'm saying that Mr. LeBlanc's judgment is obviously
impaired, his memory is impaired, his attention,

17

concentration are impaired. His ability to think
logically, even to the point of understanding
consequence is affected. I — and I don't know that
Mr. LeBlanc remembers a good part of what he does say
to people.
In short, Dr. Gant testified that Mr. LeBlanc suffered from:
1) psychological injury proximately caused by head trauma during
the automobile collision with Mr. Wilker, and 2) emotional
problems not caused by the automobile collision.

The existence

of the latter does not preclude the existence of the former.
Dr. Richard Wright, Mr. LeBlanc's chiropractor.
Direct examination by Mr. LeBlancfs counsel J. Robert Latham at
R. 240, 246, 247.
Q
And why was he a patient in your clinic?
A

He entered the clinic due to injuries sustained at the
time of a motor vehicle accident.

Q

(By Mr. Latham) Dr. Wright, would you please give us
your opinion as to whether Mr. LeBlancfs back injuries
were caused by his accident?

A

I believe they were, yes.

Q

Doctor, do you feel that all the treatments that you
rendered to Mr. LeBlanc were medically necessary?

A

I think so, yes.

The essence of Dr. Wright's testimony is that Mr. LeBlanc's
back injuries were caused by the automobile collision with Mr.
Wilker.
Dr. Daniel Vine, Mr. LeBlanc's neurologist.
Direct examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. Summerhays
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at R. 384.
Q
Can you say with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that it's your opinion that Fred LeBlanc
suffered some type of some degree of brain injury
resulting in the tinnitus, or anything else, the
ringing in the ear, in this accident?
A

I would have to say in my opinion — that was my
impression, that was my opinion. I was using that as a
working hypothesis, yes, even though it may be hard to
prove with any other type of test. But that was my
impression.

Redirect examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V.
Summerhays at R. 417.
Q
Were the medical expenses and bills that you charged to
Mr. LeBlanc reasonable and necessary under the
circumstances?
A

I thought so.

Dr. Vine affirmatively testified that Mr. LeBlanc suffered
brain injury caused by the automobile collision with Mr. Wilker,
and that the costs incurred by Mr. LeBlanc were reasonable and
necessary.
A new trial should be granted when the jury's verdict is
"manifestly against the weight of the evidence."
Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1984).

Goddard v.

Under the doctrine of

avoidable consequences, reasonable minds could not differ that
Mr. Wilker's negligence was a direct and proximate cause of Mr.
LeBlanc's post-collision ambulance ride, emergency room
treatment, diagnostic examinations, and other injuries to Mr.
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LeBlanc.

Therefore, this Court should reverse the lower court's

order denying: 1) Mr. LeBlanc's motion for a directed verdict on
the issue of proximate cause, and 2) Mr. LeBlanc's motion for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial and remand
this matter for further proceedings.
II.

EVIDENCE DISPUTING THE EXTENT OF MR. LEBLANC S INJURIES IS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT MR. WILKER'S
NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF ANY OF MR.
LEBLANC S INJURIES.
"To successfully attack the verdict, an appellant must

marshall all the evidence supporting the verdict and then
demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to that verdict, the evidence is insufficient to
support it." Cambelt, 745 P.2d at 1242. Mr. LeBlanc satisfies
his duty to marshall the evidence in order to attack the jury's
"no cause" verdict in the following section.
A.

The evidence marshaled in support of the jury's verdict is
insufficient to support that verdict.
The evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support

the jury's finding that Mr. Wilker's negligence was not the
proximate cause of any of Mr. LeBlanc's injuries, thereby
warranting a directed verdict on the issue of proximate cause, or
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and order for a new trial.
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Even when read in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, a
meaningful review of the evidence which could arguably support
the jury's verdict shows that the evidence merely fails to
affirm, rather than raises a factual question of, evidence of Mr.
LeBlanc's injuries.

The relevant portions of that evidence which

could arguably support the jury's verdict follows.
Dr. Walter H. Reichert
Direct examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. Summerhays
at R. 165.
Q
Is this the kind of an injury that can typically be
caused by a whiplash in a car accident?
A

It could be caused by a car accident, yes.

Cross examination by Mr. Wilker's counsel Brett Pearce at R. 166,
169.
Q
There is no way to be certain from your experience
whether the automobile accident in this case caused
that protrusion. Correct?
A

That is correct.

Q

There are lots of other possible causes to these types
of conditions that show on films, aren't there?

A

There are.

Q

If I am understanding you correctly, you can't say with
any reasonable degree of medical certainty that these
conditions you have diagnosed and testified about were
caused by the accident which is the subject of this
lawsuit. Right?

A

Not solely on the basis of the imaging studies.

Dr. Reichert's testimony is significant by suggesting that

21

Mr. LeBlanc's injury "could be caused by a car accident," but
that such causation could not be established with a reasonable
degree of medical certainty.

Dr. Reichert's position, at worst,

is neutral on the issue of proximate cause.
Dr. L. Vaun Mikesell, Mr. LeBlanc's maxillofacial surgeon.
Direct examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. Summerhays
at R. 338, 339.
Q
And specifically what did you see in the joint that you
thought represented a damaged condition that was caused
by the accident?
A

Again, based on the MRI, the results of the MRI
indicated that there was a mild subluxation of the
disk, which to me means that the disk is dislocated a
little anterior, not as far as we sometimes see. And
when he opened, he got onto the disk. And that I see
often in trauma, auto accidents.

Q

Was the crepitus in your opinion caused by the
accident?

A

It could have been caused by the accident.
know for sure.

I don't

Cross examination by Mr. Wilker's counsel Brett Pearce at R. 345346
Q
My question to you, Doctor, is combining the two. If
you have got the large restorations and combine
long-term bruxing with that on those teeth, could that
cause the teeth to fracture?
A

I suspect it could.

Q

This crepitus that we were talking about and it's
relationship to arthritis, there is a fairly
substantial percentage of our population that develops
this condition naturally, isn't there?

A

Of bruxism?
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Q

No.

Of crepitus.

A

Crepitus. I doi ift know 'what the population
I have
not seen statistics that would indicate to me the
population percentage of people that would have this.
The percentage of people that have TMJ disorder is
around 33 percent.

Re cr o s s ex am i i 1 a I: :i :: i :i 1: ;v 1 1 :i : W i ] k e i ' s c o un s e J B r e 11 P e a r c e a t P
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Q
Dr. Mikesell, you indicated earlier that the symptoms
you found or the condition you diagnosed could have
been related to the accident but you couldn't tell for
sure?
A

I have to go by history
relate to the accident.

Q'

By his to: .
sure?

A

That's right.

Q

So you can't say with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that they were?

^

jim

Q

So you can't say with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that they were?

A

I — I — my personal feeling, and I would say what I
said earlier, based on his history I would feel that
they were in part, if not mostly, associated with the
accident. He does not give any prior history, and I
have not seen anything to indicate that he had a prior
history of TMJ disorder.

sorry/

•
i elate

.

hey

- . can't: say for

rephrase the question.

The significance of Dr. Mikesell's testimony is that he is
unable to say within a reasonable degree of medical certainty
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that Mr. LeBlanc's TMJ and crepitus injuries were caused by the
automobile collision with Mr. Wilker.

Thus, such injuries are

not a compensable item of recovery.
Dr. Daniel Vine, Mr. LeBlanc's neurologist.
Cross examination by Mr. Wilker's counsel Brett Pearce at R. 399400.
Q
Beginning at line 17, my question is,,
"Q
Can you say with any degree of medical
certainty that the sinus or decreased sensation
that you found had anything to do causally with
the car accident in which he was involved?"
And your answer is,
"A
It would be hard for me to say with any
degree of certainty."
Do you see that?
A

I do.

Q

Does that refresh your recollection as of that day?

A

I believe that's what I believed at that time.

Q

The vision problem that Mr. LeBlanc reported to you
wasn't accident-related, was it?

A

I don't know. Again, in this constellation of
symptoms, this post concussive syndrome, there are a
lot of things we can't explain physiologically. I
believe — I don't know that. I don't know to be
honest with you. I don't know if it was.
In my exam, and I do an eye exam as part of my
exam, everything seemed to be okay. But again, we
didn't have a formal exam, so I don't know.

Q

So you can't say with any reasonable degree of medical
certainty that the vision problem had anything to do
with the accident?
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A

I think it would be hard for me to say as a
nonophthalmologist?

A

The higher tension that was described to you, that's
not accident-related, is it?

A

Again, that would be difficult, 1 think, to directly
relate to the accident. Again, : would have to say
that's a nonexpert opinion, sir,

Q

Just quickly turn to page 31 of your deposition.
at the very bottom, my question to you is,

Down

"Q
Does the hypertension in your opinion have
anything to do with the
accident?"
And you say,
"A
Initially when he went to the ER, maybe if he
was shaken up it could have been. But persistent?
I don't think so. I would be hard pressed to
relate that directly to the accident."
A

Correct.

IT.

linn

testified

IlirH

lie Wets u n a b l e to a t t r i b u t e

Mr,

LeBlanc's sinus problem, decreased sensation, vision problem, or
hypertension to the automobi
Significantly, Dr. Vine does not undermine his opinion that Mr.
LeBlanc has suffered a brain injury from the automobile
collision.
Dr. James Guinn, physician who performed an independent medical
exam (IME) at the insistence of Mr. Wilker's insurance carrier.
Direct examination by Mr. Wilker's counsel Brett Pearce at R.
500, 501.
Q
And as a clinician and looking at somebody like Mr.
?;S

LeBlanc, can you formulate an opinion as to how long
the grinding has been going on?
A

It would have had to have been at least ten years. My
frank opinion is that it would probably have been 20
years, but at least 10 years.

Q

Doctor, what did all this lead you to conclude?

A

It led me to conclude that this individual was an
extreme symptom magnifyer [sic]. That he was being
dishonest with me, that every step of the way he was
not being candid about what his problems really were.

Cross examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. Summerhays
at R. 506, 507-508, 515.
Q
Is there anything other thing that could be causing
that problem?
A

Yes.

There is a whole host of things.

Q

What is the next most likely thing?

A

The next most likely thing would be some type of
trauma.

Q

Like this accident?

A

That's a possibility.

Q

So, first it could be the grinding, second it could be
the accident. And the third you say,
". . It is my opinion that his most serious
problems are related to his neck and back, not his
jaw. Anyone with his neck and back problems would
experience jaw pain and dysfunction."
Now, that's a pretty bald, flat out statement that it
is your main opinion that the neck [sic] and jaw
problems are caused from the neck — that the jaw
problem is caused by the neck pain, isn't it?
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A

It's my opinion that he doesn't have a jaw problem,
It's my opinion that if he did have jaw pain, that the
likely source of it would be problems in his neck and
back, not organic pathology itself.

Q

Doctor, help me understand. In your opinion Mr.
LeBlanc does not have a jaw problem. Yet you say in
your letter, "Anyone --" and he is somebody -- "anyone
with his neck and back problems would experience jaw
pain and dysfunction." What does that mean if it
doesn't mean that Mr. LeBlanc is suffering,
experiencing jaw pain and dysfunction because he has
those kinds of neck and back problems. Isn't that what
that means?

A

Yes.

Q

Now, y ou also said in your letter, didn't you, the
clicking in his jaw may have been caused by the injury
in question?

A

Yes.

Dr. Gu 11 n :
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that although Mr. LeBlanc is "an extreme symptom magnifier," Mr.
LeBlanc nonetheless had symptoms of inji lry

Dr

Gi i :i i .1 1

effectively rendered an opinion that Mr. LeBlanc's jaw pain and
dysfunction resulted from bruxism, not the automobile collision

Dr. Lester John Nielsen, Jr., Social Security psychologist.
Direct examination by Mr. Wilker's counsel Brett Pearce at R.
586, 587.
Q
Okay. In what way are all of these things that you
have just described significant from your perspective?
A

Well, it certainly leads me to believe, unless
something really traumatic happened to him between the

time Dr. Gummow saw him and the time I saw him, he has
to be embellishing — what do you call it? —
malingering or whatever we want to call it.
He did the opposite with me as he did with Dr.
Guinn. I had to pull
everything out. Instead of
answering that he had all these problems with me, I had
to observe that here was somebody really not able to
communicate. I acknowledged he must have been in pain.
He had a problem with his jaw, although he didn't pace
around when he was with me. And I noticed that with
some things that — his demeanor in other situations
seemed to change somewhat.
I had no idea whether either he had been on — he
did show me the medications he was taking, the capsules
that day, the bottles. But he didn't seem to be able
to tell me much about what they were for or how often
he took them.
Q

What is your opinion at this time?

A

Well, I certainly think that there were marked
discrepancys [sic] between the person's claimed stress
or disability and the objective findings. I think II
and III there kind of stand out for me. I am in a
position with what I have done that I would need to —
I don't know what the ultimate outcome is here, but I
would have the [sic] send an addendum back to Social
Security to fill them in on what's gone on.

Dr. Nielson's testimony merely states an opinion that Mr.
LeBlanc was malingering with respect to his psychological
problems, thereby providing sufficient evidence to find that Mr.
LeBlanc did not suffer psychological injury from the automobile
collision with Mr. Wilker.
Dr. Richard Schwartz, Mr. LeBlanc's neurosurgeon.
Direct examination by Mr. Wilker's counsel Brett Pearce at R.
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616-617.
Q

A

Thank you. Now, what was your opinion on that day
regarding whether Mr, LeBlanc needed surgery in his
back or neck?
Well, I didnft think that he was a good surgical
candidate. But we have already looked at that. And I
did order an MRI of the lumbar spine that hadn't been
done. And that's an expensive test. But he is six
months out from injury so I thought we ought to look at
that again. But I wasn't impressed clinically that I
could really confirm from his examination anything that
would fit with that L 4/5 disk bulge.
And often after
motor vehicle accidents, flexion/extension injuries,
there is a constellation of signs — insomnia,
nonorganic pain — that kind of gets caught up into the
secondary gain and this legal system we are in. And
it's hard to separate
out, and we see that often.
But I wasn' t convinced that he should have any
surgical procedure. And basically the other physicians
don ! t have to make that decision.

Di:
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conclude that Mr. LeBlanc was not injured in the automobile
collision with Mr. Wilker, only that Mr. LeBlanc's back iiljury
does not warrant surgery.
Dr. Linda Gummow, Mr. LeBlanc's neuropsychologist.
Direct examination by Mr. Wilker's counsel Brett Pearce at R.
639-640, 645.
Q
With regard to your opinion at the time you created
your report or generated your report, what was your
conclusion with regard to Mr. LeBlancfs overall
condition and the relationship of that condition
the
car accident and to the Agent Orange?
A

Well, I didn't feel at that time that you could
attribute the magnitude of problems that I was seeing
to the car accident. It was out of the range of the

normal that you see. Car accidents with a brief loss
of consciousness where someone comes back to
consciousness at the scene is rarely associated with
long-term disability, except in maybe to 7 to 10
percent of the case there can be some long-term
disability.
So when you see someone who is functioning
essentially in the range of someone who would be
classified as mentally retarded you have to say, okay,
how does this happen? It doesn't make sense. So
that's why I was looking for some other physical
explanation I thought that might explain why his
performance was so poor.
Q

Doctor, since reviewing all of the information that you
received from my office, has that impacted your
opinions from a psychological standpoint regarding Mr.
LeBlanc?

A

Yes.

Q

What is your opinion now regarding Mr. LeBlanc?

A

I believe that the evidence is quite convincing that
Mr. LeBlanc has been malingering.

Q

Doctor, given all this, can you say with any degree of
reasonable certainty that Mr. LeBlanc sustained any
head injury in this accident?

A

No, I cannot.

Cross examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. Summerhays
at R. 645.
Q
Can you say with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that he did not receive any brain injury in
this accident?
A

No.

Dr. Gummow's testimony is significant for her opinion that
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M r . L e B l a n c is m a l i n g e r i n g w i t h respect to h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l
injur ie,1-
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unable I >. counter witli n

r e a s o n a b l e d e g r e e o f m e d i c a l certainty the t e s t i m o n y of D r . V i n e
that M r . L e B l a n c s u f f e r e d a b r a i n injury from t h e a u t o m o b i l e
c o l l i s i o n w i t h Mi

Wi Iker.

In s u m m a r y , t h e statement of t h e record in t h e light m o s t
f avorab 1 e to 1:1 i = j i :n r ] * • s verdic t is as f o 1J c ws .

Dr . R e i c h e r t

t e s t i f i e d that a l t h o u g h M r . L e B l a n c ' s injury " c o u l d b e c a u s e d b y
a car accidp-

- e was i n :i
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medical certainty that Mr. LeBlanc's injury was caused by the
rear-end automobile collision with Mr. Wilker.
Dr. Gant, a psychologist, testified that Mr

(R. ] 65-

] 69).

LeBlanc's suffered

psychological trauma both attributable to the rear-end automobile
collision with T l,r . Wilker, and not attributable to the collision.
(R. 265-296).

Dr. Wright testified that he believed Mr.

L e B 1 a i i c' s b a c k :i i i j u r i e s w e i: e c a i i s e d b y t h e r e a i - e i i d c o 11 i s i o n
w i t h M r . W i l k e r , a n d that h i s treatment o f M r . L e B l a n c w a s
reasonable and necessary.

(R. 24 0, 24 6, 2 4 7 ) .

D r . M i k e s e l l t e s t i f i e d that M r . L e B l a n c ' s d i s k i n j u r y " c o u l d
have been caused b y the accident.
2 :

\ 7:i !::1

i: egai d 1: : I l:i

I don't know for s u r e . "

LeBlanc' s

(R.

injury, Dr . M i k e s e l l

t e s t i f i e d t h a t , a l t h o u g h could n o t s a y for sure w h e t h e r it w a s

related to the rear-end collision with Mr. Wilker, when asked by
Mr. Wilker's counsel "So you can't say with a reasonable degree
of medical certainty that [Mr. LeBlanc's TMJ symptoms] were
[related]?", Dr. Mikesell replied: "[B]ased on his history, I
would feel that they were in part, if not mostly, associated with
the accident.

He does not give any prior history, and I have not

seen anything to indicate that he had a prior history of TMJ
disorder."

(R. 349).

Dr. Vine testified with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that Mr. LeBlanc suffered from "some type of some
degree of brain injury" and that the medical expenses and bills
he charged to Mr. LeBlanc were "reasonable and necessary under
the circumstances."

(R. 384, 417). Dr. Vine also testified that

he was unable to state with any degree of medical certainty that
Mr. LeBlanc's sinus, decreased sensation, vision problem,
hypertension were related to the rear-end collision with Mr.
Wilker.

(R. 399-400).

Dr. Geruso testified that although Mr. LeBlanc complained of
some neck and back pain, diagnostic examinations revealed no
fractures, full range of neck motion, "full flexion and forward
and lateral flexion," and normal "strength and sensation in the
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arms."

(R. 4 4 7 - 4 4 8 ) ,

Dr. Geruso's d i a g n o s i s after e x a m i n i n g M r .

L e B 1 a n c :i i 1 11 Ie e m e r g e n c y r c :>in i a s "ce:i : \ i ca ] i ieck s11 ain,
s t r a i n and also lumbar m u s c l e s t r a i n . "
t e s t i f i e d *•*..•

:i '

.

x - r a y s and a CT scan
Dr.

(R. 4 5 0 ) .

Dr. Geruso

w a s s e r i o u s e n o n i j I: J l u

(I \

50] )

A c c o r d i n g to Dr

symptom

Guinn, M r . L e B l a n c ' s jaw

p r o b l e m s could have stemmed from teeth g r i n d i n g or bruxism,
pre"- existed

MI,JII

.

G u i n n t e s t i f i e d that M r . L e B l a n c w a s an " e x t r e m e

magnifier.

muscle

and

Ui»- i^di-end <iiit.omubile c o l l i s i o n w i t h M r . W i l k e r .

(R. 4 4 9 - 5 0 3 ) .

Dr. Guinn also attributed M r . L e B l a n c ' s TMJ

d i s o r d e r t : "" p i: o b J e m s j i i 1 :i :i s i I e c k a i i :i I: a c ] :: , i I • : 1: c i: g a i i i c p a t 1 I o I o g y
itself."
Mr.

(R. 5 0 8 ) ,

;. : , Nielsen, a p s y c h o l o g i s t , t e s t i f i e d that

L e B l a n c "has to be e m b e l l i s h i n g , " '"malingering or w h a t e v e r

you want to r-.
" d i d n ' t think t\>h~

S c h w a r t z t e s t i f i e d that he
IM^. LeBlanc] was a good s u r g i c a l

for

. .ge.

(K,

It,) .

candidate"

Dr, Gummow, a

n e u r o p s y c h o l o g i s t , t e s t i f i e d that in her o p i n i o n "the e v i d e n c e is
q u i t e c o n v i n c i n g that
645).

Mr
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Dr. Gummow, a l t h o u g h b e i n g unable to t e s t i f y w i t h a

r e a s o n a b l e d e g r e e of m e d i c a l certainty that M r . LeBlanc

II

not

s u s t a i n any b r a i n injury related to the r e a r - e n d c o l l i s i o n w i t h
Mr.

W i l k e r , was also u n a b l e to testify "with any d e g r e e of
33

reasonable certainty that Mr. LeBlanc sustained any head injury
in [the rear-end collision]."

(R. 645).

As discussed in Point I, supra, no evidence exists
supporting the jury's verdict that Mr. Wilker's negligence was
not the proximate cause of any of Mr. LeBlanc's injuries.

In

Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme
Court held that an appellate court "will not upset a jury verdict
unless there is a showing that the evidence so clearly
preponderates against the prevailing party that reasonable people
would not differ on the outcome of the case."

Smith, 699 P.2d at

764.
The evidence may be sufficient to invalidate some of Mr.
LeBlanc's claimed injuries, but not all; especially not his
expenses incurred from the post-collision ambulance transport,
emergency room treatment, diagnostic examinations, and other
injuries.

When evidence is so lacking or so slight and

unconvincing in favor of a jury verdict, it is proper for an
appellate court to reverse a ruling that is plainly unreasonable
and unjust.

See, e.g., Marsh v. Irvine, 449 P.2d 996, 998 (Utah

1969) ("[T]he jury should not be allowed such unbridled license
as to base its verdict upon something which would be a physical
impossibility.").

Because a meaningful review of the evidence
34

w h i c h could arguably support the jury's verdict shows that the
evidence m e r e l y fail

• -

-

question of, some of M r . LeBlanc's injuries, this Court should
reverse the jury's verdict and remand this case for further
proceedings.
X.
Com

, .

CONCLUSION

">e unable to do much to counter the influence of

insurance industry propaganda upon lay j u r o r s .

Courts are,

h o w e v e r , ot J i g> s- ::i t : :i i i t e r ? e.z le w 1 lei i tl le facts ai id tl le law warrant
a directed v e r d i c t , or when lay jurors issue a verdict that is
u n s u p p o r t a b l e and unjust a s ^ maf t e t n f l ^>
W h e r e f o r e , premises considered, this Court should reverse
the lower court's order denying M r . LeBlanc's m o t i o n for ji ldgment
no*

-.••:*

he verdict and new trial should be reversed and

remanded this case for a new trial on all issues or other
proceeding

In I hi:.1 n ] LtuLiid I \\/v,

Llu.s I U U I I

should remand the

lower court's denial of M r . LeBlanc's directed verdict on the
issue of p r o x i m a t e cause and remar
all issues or other p r o c e e d i n g s .
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of March 1996.
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

X

LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DE LIVERY
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT (LeBlanc v. Wilker) were handdelivered , this 29th day of March 1996, to the office of the
following:
Brett G. Pearce
Richard K. Spratley & Associates
4021 South 700 East, Suite 420
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

XI.

ADDENDUM

•- Judgment, DecenibeJ. I'1, 1994.
Exhibit ""B" — Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and New Trial, December 19,
1994.
Exhibit "C" —

Order, April 3, 1995.

Exhibit "D" —

Notice of Appeal, April 26, 1995.
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EXHIBIT "A"

FILED IN CLARK'S 6mQ£
Salt LaKc County Utah

BRETT G. PEARCE [522 0]
RICHARD K. SPRATLEY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Defendant
4021 South 700 East, #420
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 266-7007

Dec i wwn
By.
Deputy Clerl

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
..ooOoo..
FRED LEBLANC,

:
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

:

ol^b^SO
CIVIL NO. 930904424PI

JAMES WILKER,

:
Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendant.

:

The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial in the
above-captioned Court before the Honorable Anne M. Stirba on November
29, 1994. The plaintiff appeared through counsel Lowell V. Summerhays
and Robert Latham, defendant appeared through counsel Brett G. Pearce.
A jury was empaneled.

Evidence was introduced, the jury instructed

and the matter being fully argued the case was submitted to the jury
which upon due deliberation, returned and made the following:
SPECIAL VERDICT
We, the jury in the above-entitled action find from a
preponderance of the evidence the answers to the interrogatories or
questions propounded to us as follows:
1.

Was defendant's negligence a proximate cause of the injuries

sustained by the plaintiff?
&HSHEE:

2.

Yes

No

X

If you have answered Question 1 " y e s " , s t a t e t h e amount

of special and general damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff
as a proximate result of the injuries
question was not answered "yes", do not answer this question.
ANSWER:
Special Damages:

;•_ _________

General Damages:

$

TOTAL
WHEREFOR E

.

i x >< :)i 1 Mc: t i • :x „ • : f ief€

dant, and :::.

;:ai lse a p p e a r i n g ,

i s hereby
O R D E R E D , A D J U D G E D A N D D E C R E E D , that judgment
favor c f d^fpMiihiii

fnij

a^jdiiiot plaint; ill

^
^

h e r e b v e n t e r e d in
.

c:. a c t i o n a n d d e f e n d a n t is a w a r d e d h i s costs o f court

_r n o cause
* he s u m of

F I V E T H O U S A N D , E I G H T H U N D R E D SEVENTY T W O D O L L A R S A N D S I X C E N T S
i i is r e e l e c t e d b y t h e M e m o r a n d u m o: C o s t s .

I d o h e r e b y c e r t i f y that on this

^ ^

d a y o f December,

m a i l e d a true a n d correct copy o f t h e foregoing

'udgment t o L o w e l l V.

Summer-hays, E; Er 3 , 1 D A M S O N & SI JM1 1ERHAYS, ^ - r.a-314r

Murray, Utah 8 4 1 0 .

-2-

1993, I
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EXHIBIT "B"

FILED

Lowell V. Summerhays (3154)
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS
6400 Commerce Plaza
448 East 6400 South, Suite 135
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-4495

^ n ' C n Fn3:25
- «- -
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L
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PLAINTIFFS
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT AND
NEW TRIAL

FRED LEBLANC,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 930904424PI
JAMES WILKER,
Judge Anne M. Stirba
Defendant.
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Fred LeBlanc, by and through Lowell
V. Summerhays of the firm Adamson & Summerhays and moves the
above-entitled court for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
and a new trial, pursuant to Rules 50(b) and 59(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and submits a Memorandum in Support
thereof concurrently with this motion.
DATED this J /

day of December, 1994.

ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS

Lowell V. Summerhays

MAITJNG CERTIFT CAT K

I hei-Hry' certify that I mailed a true and correct copy c:r the
foregoing Memorandum In Support of Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment
Notwithstanding the verdict, first class mail, postage pre-paid to
ill I 11

1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 in i 11 ii;

Brett Pearce, Esq,
Richard K. Spratley & Associates
4021 South 700 East, #420
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

FILED

Lowell V. Summerhays
ADAMSONfieSUMMERHAYS
6400 Commerce Plaza
448 East 6400 South, Suite 135
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-4495

c* , .— . — , 1 ^ - .
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FRED LEBLANC,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT AND
NEW TRIAL

VS.

Civil No. 930904424PI
JAMES WILKER,
Judge Anne M. Stirba
Defendant.
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Fred LeBlanc, by and through Lowell
V. Summerhays of the firm Adamson & Summerhays herewith submits
the following Memorandum In Support of Plaintifffs Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and New Trial, pursuant to
Rules 50(b) and 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1.

On November 29, 1994, the above-entitled case came in

the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah before Judge Anne M. Stirba and a jury for four days.
2.

Both parties presented evidence, had expert witnesses

and lay witnesses testify, and argued their cases.
3.

During the trial, counsel for the plaintiff made a

motion for directed verdict on the grounds that the defendant was
negligent in the operation of his automobile, that the
defendant's negligence resulted in a rear-end collision with the
plaintiff's automobile, that the plaintiff sustained injuries

from the collision resulting in damages to the plaintiff, and
that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries resulting in damages to the plaintiff.
4.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion on the issue of

negligence and denied the plaintiff's motion on the issue of
damages and proximate cause, which went to the jury.
5.

Upon due deliberation, the jury returned a verdict that

the defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries resulting in damages to the plaintiff, and
therefore, did not reach the issue of damages.

ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD ENTER A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT THAT THE DAMAGES THE PLAINTIFF SUSTAINED IN A REAREND AUTOMOBILE COLLISION WERE DIRECTLY AND PROXIMATELY
CAUSED BY THE DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE.
The evidence presented by doctors testifying at trial was

that the plaintiff was injured as the result of a rear-end
automobile collision with the defendant on October 6, 1992.

The

jury, however, rendered a verdict that the collision was not a
proximate cause of any of the plaintiff's injuries.

In Koer v.

Mavfair Mkts., 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967), the court
granted a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because
of the absence of any substantial evidence to support the
verdict.

In the instant case, the defendant failed to submit

substantial evidence at trial proving that the defendant's
negligence did not directly and proximately cause injuries to the
plaintiff resulting in damage to the plaintiff.
2

For example, at trial the plaintiff submitted into evidence
medical bills for transportation of the plaintiff to the
emergency room of Holy Cross Hospital via Gold Cross Ambulance
shortly after the rear-end automobile collision.

However,

despite the defendant's failure to proffer any evidence to prove
that these costs were neither incurred by the plaintiff nor
reasonable and necessary, the jury returned with a verdict
stating that the defendant's negligence was not a proximate cause
of any of the plaintiff's injuries resulting in damage to the
plaintiff.
Because reasonable minds could not differ that the
defendant's negligence was a direct and proximate cause of the
post-collision ambulance ride, emergency room treatment, and
other injuries to the plaintiff resulting in damages to the
plaintiff, this court should enter a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict finding that the defendant's negligence directly and
proximately caused injuries to the plaintiff resulting in damages
to the plaintiff.

II.

ALTERNATIVELY, THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT.
Should this court deny plaintiff's motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict, this court should grant plaintiff's
motion for a new trial.

Pursuant to the testimony of Dr. Walter

Reichert, Dr. Richard Wright and Dr. Daniel Vine, the plaintiff
did sustain injuries as the result of the rear-end automobile
3

collision on October 6, 1992.

In addition, at the scene of the

rear-end automobile collision, the plaintiff was transported by
ambulance to Holy Cross Hospital and treated by an emergency room
physician, Dr. Amy Geruso, who was called by the defendant and
testified that the plaintiff was indeed injured and that the
plaintiff had been subjected to x-rays and other diagnostic tests
to ascertain the extent of his injuries.

Furthermore, other

doctors called by the defendant at trial testified that the
plaintiff had been injured in the rear-end automobile collision
at issue.
By determining that the defendant's negligence was not the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries causing damage to the
plaintiff, the jury did not reach the issue of damages.
Therefore, because insufficient evidence exists to support the
jury's verdict, this court should grant the plaintiff's motion
for a new trial.

DATED this

of December, 1994.

Respectfully submitted,
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS

Lowell V. Summerhays

4

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion For
Judgment Notwithstanding the verdict, first class mail, postage
pre-paid to the following:

Brett Pearce, Esq.
Richard K. Spratley & Associates
4021 South 700 East, #420
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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EXHIBIT "C"

BRETT G. PEARCE [5220]
RICHARD K. SPRATLEY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Defendant
4021 S o u t h 700 E a s t , #420
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 266-7007

^~V'%*~'-^ "--"•"
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
..00O00. .

FRED LEBLANC,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs .
CIVIL NO. 930904424PI
JAMES WILKER,
Judge Anne M. Stirba
Defendant.
CAME ON for hearing, plaintiffs Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for a New Trial, on
March 13, 1995 at 1:30 p.m.

Plaintiff was represented by his

attorneys of record, Lowell V. Summerhays and Robert Latham.
Defendant was represented by his counsel of record, Brett G. Pearce.
Both parties had previously submitted written memoranda to the
Court arguing their respective positions pertaining to the abovedescribed Motion.

At the hearing, both parties presented oral

argument to the Court.
After reviewing the written memoranda and considering oral
argument, the Court was of the opinion that ample evidence existed
which supported the jury verdict and that plaintiff had failed to
carry his burden pertaining to the instant Motion, to gather all of
the evidence in support of the verdict and show that it was in some
way insufficient to support the verdict.

Therefore, after fully considering plaintiff's Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for a New
Trial, and being fully advised, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for a New
Trial is denied.
DATED this

r-A
day of

^

1995
BY THE COURT:

^

fr^^x

PX;^T,TH|S'SATRUECOPY

v -Vc-u£'N£LD°CUMENTONFILE

Honorable Ann
Third District

• ^ COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

0£Pi/TY COURT

C U

^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I do hereby certify that on this ^2Q_/day of March 1995, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to Lowell V.
Summerhays, Esq., ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS, 448 East 6400 South, Suite
314, Murray, Utah

84107.
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EXHIBIT "D"
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Lowell V. Summerhays - 3154
J. Robert Latham - 6915
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS
448 East 6400 South, Suite 135
Murray, Utah
84107
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

)

FRED LEBLANC,
Plaintiff and Appellant

NOTICE OF APPEAL

]

vs.

i

Civil No. 930904424PI

JAMES WILKER,

1

Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendant and Appellee

Notice

is

hereby

given

)

that

Plaintiff

and Appellant,

Fred

LeBlanc, by and through counsel, Lowell V. Summerhays, of the firm
of ADAMSON

& SUMMERHAYS,

appeals

to the Utah

Supreme

Court

the

final order of the Honorable Anne M. Stirba entered in this matter
on April 3, 1995.

The appeal is taken from the entire

judgment.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
NOTICE OF APPEAL was mailed to the following, postage paid, on the
J?£**aay of April, 1995.
Brett G. Pearce
RICHARD K. SPRATLEY & ASSOCIATES
4021 South 700 East, #420
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
is'
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